28 February 2009

PEP: Financial Analysis through December 2008 (Update)

Back on Valentine's Day, we posted an analysis of PepsiCo's (NYSE: PEPpress release announcing fourth-quarter earnings.  This super-sized period consisted of the 16 weeks that ended on 27 December 2008.

The company subsequently filed a more complete 10-K for fiscal 2008.  We examined the 10-K and determined that the data it contained did not significantly alter the original analysis, nor did it change the gauge scores.

PepsiCo, Inc., is a leading global purveyor of beverages and snacks.  While famously locked in a battle with Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO), the Frito-Lay North America division takes in more Revenue, and it contributes more to Operating Profit, than the PepsiCo Americas Beverages unit.

The 10-K contains an excellent description of PepsiCo's business organization, strategy, and recent results.  The following tidbits of information caught our attention:
  • Operations outside of the U.S. provide 48 percent of Revenue.
  • Sales of "Liquid refreshment" beverages in the U.S. declined in 2008.
  • Sales to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (NYSE: WMT), including Sam’s Club, were about 12 percent of total Revenue.
  • The face value of open commodity derivative contract (those that qualify as hedges and those that don't) were $928 million when 2008 ended, up from only $110 million in 2007.
  • PepsiCo recognized $346 million of mark-to-market net losses on commodity hedges in 2008, up from only $19 million in 2007.
  • The company intends to spend up to $2.5 billion repurchasing shares in 2009. Repurchases totaled $4.7 billion in 2008.
  • Of the various ways to determine the fair value of financial items, PepsiCo did not need to use the "Level 3" method that relies the most on management judgment for any of its financial assets and liabilities.

KG: Financial Analysis through December 2008

King Pharmaceuticals recently announced earnings for the quarter that ended on 31 December 2008.  This post provides the GCFR analysis for the period, which was the fourth quarter of the fiscal year.

On 29 December 2008, King completed the $1.6 billion acquisition of Alpharma, Inc. (NYSE: ALO), and Alpharma became a wholly owned subsidiary.  A $600 million charge due to the purchase resulted in King reporting substantial net losses for the fourth quarter and full year.

The press release announcing these results did not include complete financial statements and notes.  We will reevaluate our analysis when the information becomes available in the company's 10-K filing.


King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NYSE: KG) manufactures and sells various brand-name prescription pharmaceuticals.  Headquartered in Bristol, TN, King now focuses on specialty products for the neuroscience, hospital and acute care markets. 

To gain Federal Trade Commission approval of the Alpharma acquisition, King sold the KADIAN drug for $127.5 million to Iceland's Actavis.  KADIAN, which was responsible for 23 percent of Alpharma's total revenues in 2007, is used for the treatment of moderate to severe chronic pain.


King reported on 21 January 2009 that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York invalidated two U.S. patents relating to SKELAXIN® (metaxalone), a muscle relaxant.  King plans to appeal the Court's order.  In the first nine months of 2008, King's SKELAXIN sales were $333 million, which was 29 percent of the company's Net Sales during this period.

Given the Alpharma acquisition and the SKELAXIN decision, it is not terribly surprising that King announced cost-cutting workforce reductions affecting about 22 percent of its employees.

King must have been bitterly disappointed when, last December, the U.S. FDA asked for additional non-clinical data on the abuse-resistant painkiller REMOXY King is developing with Pain Therapeutics, Inc. (NASDAQ: PTIE).

These recent setbacks came not long after King suffered its greatest reversal.  In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals invalidated King's patent for Altace® (Ramipril).  This ACE inhibitor, used to treat patients with cardiovascular risks, had accounted for roughly 1/3 of King's net sales.  The Court's decision resulted in King recognizing asset impairment charges (covering intangible assets and inventory) totaling $250 million and King laying off 20 percent of its staff.



Three months ago, the GCFR Overall Gauge of King Pharmaceuticals increased from 50 to 74 of the 100 possible points.  Our analysis report on the September quarter explained the results in some detail.  (Note that the scores are not exactly as reported originally because of some changes to our algorithms.)  Despite Revenue in the third quarter falling almost 30 percent, the score rose primarily because the sinking price per share made the valuation appear more attractive.  In addition, our gauges reacted positively to decreasing operating expenses as a percentage of Revenue.


Now, with the data from the December quarter, our gauges are displaying the following scores:

  • Overall: 25 of 100 (down from 74)
 
Before we examine the factors that affected each gauge, we will review the latest quarterly Income Statement and compare it to our previously communicated expectations.

Please note that the table format below, which we use for all analyses, can and often does differ in material respects from company-used formats.  A common difference is the classification of income and expenses as Operating and Non-Operating.  The standardization is simply for convenience and to facilitate cross-company comparisons.


http://sheet.zoho.com/public/ncarvin/kg-income-statement?mode=html




Revenue in the fourth quarter was 34.8 percent below that in the December 2007 period, and it fell below our estimate by 6.7 percent.  Sales of Altace in the fourth quarter dropped from $166 million to $14 million.

Full-year Revenue plunged 27 percent from 2007 to 2008.

The Cost of Goods Sold (CGS) -- Cost of Revenues on King's Income Statement -- in the quarter was 26.9 percent of Revenue, which translates into a Gross Margin of 73.1 percent.  Our target for the margin, based on guidance provided earlier by company management, was 74 percent. 

Depreciation and Amortization expenses were consistent with the earlier guidance.  These expenses were 8.5 percent of Revenue

Research and Development expenses were 9.1 percent of Revenue, and they were a substantial $7 million less than the $39 million we anticipated.  Our target was based on management's guidance this past November that R&D expenses in 2008 would be about $150 million. 

Sales, General, and Administrative (SG&A) expenses were 30.2 percent of Revenue.  Our target had been 28 percent.   However, since Revenue was less than we expected, actual SG&A expenses equaled the amount we projected.  Co-promotion fees for Altace dropped from $37 million to $3 million.

In the December 2008 quarter, King recorded asset impairment, restructuring, and other operating charges of $610 million. The lion's share of this amount was $593 million for in-process R&D associated with the Alpharma acquisition.  Not having any data to forecast this charge, we had anticipated special charges of (only!) $44 million.

The huge charges dropped Operating Income, which is total sales less all operating expenses, to a $522 million loss.  However, if special items are excluded, Operating Income was $87 million.  This figure is better than we expected, and better than in the December 2007 quarter. 

Net Non-Operating (primarily interest) Income was a few million less than forecast, but there was also an unanticipated $7.5 million investment loss. 

Given the pre-tax loss, the income tax rate is immaterial.  However, when special items are excluded, the income tax rate was 33 percent.  The guidance was 34.0 percent. 

Net Income on a GAAP basis was a $548 million ($2.25/share) loss.  Non-GAAP income was $49 million ($0.24/share), which was $0.07 per share better than our projection.





Cash ManagementDecember 2008
3 months prior
12 months prior
Current Ratio1.7
5.34.0
LTD/Equity
44.2%
14.6%15.9%
Debt/CFO (*)
2.9 years
0.7 years
0.6 years
Inventory/CGS
173 days
109 days
109 days
Finished Goods/Inventory
N/A
64.4%55.6%
Days of Sales Outstanding (DSO)50.0 days
45.2 days
38.4 days
Working Capital/Market Capitalization  16.6%
50.2%
47.1%
Cash Conversion Cycle Time149.2 days
86.9 days
83.7 days
Gauge Score (0 to 25)
3
13
18
* calculated with estimated data for 2008-4Q

During the fourth quarter, King's holdings of Cash were cut by $290 million, Short-term debt and the currently due portion of Long-term Debt went from 0 to $444 million, and the rest of Long-term Debt increased from $400 million to $963 million.  These figures sum to $1.3 billion, so it is safe to say that the changes were, more or less, associated with the $1.55 billion spent to acquire Alpharma.

The acquisition, therefore, is the principal explanation for the big drop in the Current Ratio, the big increase in the Debt levels, and the reduced Working Capital.  However, the new numbers are not especially alarming, and we would expect King to refinance a big chunk of short-term debt to long-term paper when market conditions allow. 

The large rise in inventory may be in preparation for new product launches, but it might also signify the extent to which sales were less than management expected.


GrowthDecember 20083 months prior
12 months prior
Revenue growth-26.8%
-17.3%
7.5%
Revenue/Assets 40.7%
50.8%
63.3%
CFO growth (*)
-27%
0.0%
44.5%
Net Income growth N/A
45.5%
-36.5%
Gauge Score (0 to 25)0
8
4
Growth rates are trailing four quarters compared to four previous quarters.
* calculated with estimated data for 2008-4Q

With rapidly declining sales and decelerated Cash Flow, Growth isn't a big part of the current landscape at King.  Negative Net Income, as a result of special charges, makes growth rates for the measure irrelevant.


ProfitabilityDecember 20083 months prior
12 months prior
Operating Expenses/Revenue 114%
79.9%89.4%
ROIC N/A%
12.8%10.8%
FCF/Equity (*)
18.4%
20.7%26.0%
Accrual Ratio (*)
-37.2%
-27.1%8.4%
Gauge Score (0 to 25)12
20
11
* calculated with estimated data for 2008-4Q

Operating Expenses are distorted by the special charges.  If these are ignored in all time periods, Operating Expenses decreased from 73 percent of Revenue in 2007 to 72 percent in 2008.


ValueDecember 20083 months prior
12 months prior
P/E N/A
9.1
13.7
P/E to S&P 500 average P/E N/A
50.8%76.8%
Price/Revenue 1.7
1.3
1.2
Enterprise Value/Cash Flow (EV/CFO) (*)
6.2
2.42.3
Gauge Score (0 to 25)5
22
23
* calculated with estimated data for 2008-4Q

King's stock price rose over the course of the quarter from $9.58 to $10.62.  The valuation ratios above can be compared with other Drug Manufacturers.


OverallDecember 20083 months prior
12 months prior
Gauge Score (0 to 100) 25
74
66


The big news of the fourth quarter for King Pharmaceutical was the closing of its acquisition of Alpharma.  King used funds from its cash war chest and took on additional debt to pay the $1.5 billion price for this purchase.  (Was it worth it given the forced Kadian divestiture?)

Almost 40 percent of the acquisition price was written off as an in-process R&D expense.

Over the longer term, the invalidation of two U.S. patents relating to SKELAXIN® (metaxalone)
might prove to be more important.

Revenue in the fourth quarter fell by 34.8 percent, and full-year Revenue plunged 27 percent from 2007 to 2008.  Greatly reduced sales of Altace was the dominant reason sales dropped.

After the Altace decision, our rearward-looking gauges were painting a too rosy view of King Pharmaceuticals.  However, the latest acquisition costs are having the opposite effect on the Overall Gauge.  When we revisit King after it files a 10-K report, we will see if we can improve the realism of the scores.

26 February 2009

KG Earnings Announcement 2008-4Q

King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NYSE: KG) has announced a huge loss for the quarter that ended on 31 December 2008.

Much of the loss was due to charges, exceeding $600 million, that were associated with the $1.6 billion acquisition of Alpharma, Inc. (NYSE: ALO).  This transaction was completed near the end of the quarter.

To gain Federal Trade Commission, King sold the KADIAN drug for $127.5 million.


The full GCFR analysis of the quarter will be posted within the next few days.  The spreadsheet below, which differs in material respects from the company-used presentation, compares the latest results to the model we posted previously.  The model didn't include the special charges.


http://sheet.zoho.com/public/ncarvin/kg-income-statement?mode=html

25 February 2009

HD: Financial Analysis through January 2009

Home Depot announced earnings for the 13 weeks that ended on 1 February 2009.  This post provides the initial GCFR analysis for the period, which was the fourth quarter of the company's fiscal 2008.  (Note that the fourth quarter of fiscal 2007 included a 14th week.)

To update the GCFR gauges, we had to make a few assumptions because the Balance Sheet in Home Depot's press release omitted some details and because a Cash Flow Statement was not provided.  We will recompute the gauge scores when complete financial statements and notes become available in the company's 10-K filing.


The Home Depot, Inc. (NYSE: HD) is the largest retailer of do-it-yourself merchandise, which includes building materials, home improvement supplies, and lawn and garden products.  The company competes fiercely with Lowe's (NYSE: LOW) and a multitude of smaller hardware and lumber retailers

Investors with large stakes in Home Depot include RBS Partners, L.P., and Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A).  RBS is associated with Edward Lampert, Chairman of Sears Holdings (NASDAQ:SHLD).  Berkshire, of course, is run by investing guru Warren Buffett.

In January 2009, Home Depot announced it will discontinue its EXPO Design Center business.  The EXPO stores "offer products and services primarily related to design and renovation projects."  To account for store closure-related asset impairments, severance pay, and other related expenses, Home Depot recognized a pre-tax charge of $387 million in the fourth quarter.  Additional charges totaling $142 million are anticipated in future quarters.

The Expo shutdown came on top of a decision in May 2008 to forgo 50 or so planned stores in the U.S. and to close 15 existing stores.  Home Depot recorded pretax charges of $586 million in conjunction with these two actions.

HD Supply, a former Home Depot division serving professional contractors, was sold to a consortium of private equity firms in 2007, and Home Depot then repurchased $10.7 billion of its common shares.  As part of  the sale, Home Depot invested $325 million for a 12.5 percent equity stake in HD Supply.  Now, in recognition of the reduced market value of this investment, Home Depot recorded a $163 million pre-tax charge in the fourth quarter.  It should be noted that Home Depot has guaranteed $1.0 billion of HD Supply debt.


Three months ago, the GCFR Overall Gauge of Home Depot slipped from 45 to 41 of the 100 possible points.  Our initial and updated analysis reports on the the third quarter explained the results in some detail.

The Cash Management and Value gauges were reasonably strong at 14 and 13 points, respectively, of the 25 possible points.  Growth, at zero points, was non-existent.  Revenue in the quarter was 6.2 percent less than in the year-earlier period.  Same-store sales were down a substantial 8.3 percent, but (only?) by 7 percent if a shift in the fiscal calendar is considered.  Trailing four-quarter Revenue fell 3.6 percent and Net Income from continuing operations was down 29.4 percent.


Now, with actual and estimated data for the fourth quarter, our gauges display the following scores:

  • Overall:  40 of 100 (down from 41)

These scores are subject to change after the 10-K report is filed.


Because Home Depot's corporate structure changed substantially in 2007, our gauge scores should be treated with an extra dose of skepticism.  GCFR numbers are determined in part by comparing current financial data with historic results, but the validity of some recent comparisons is questionable.  Caution is also advisable because of the state of the housing market.

Before examining the metrics associated with each gauge, we will compare the latest quarterly Income Statement to our previously announced baseline, which was modified after the Expo decision.

Please note that the presentation format below, which we use for all analyses, may differ in material respects from company-used formats.  A common difference is the classification of income and expenses as Operating and Non-Operating.  The standardization is simply for convenience and to facilitate cross-company comparisons.

http://sheet.zoho.com/public/ncarvin/hd-income-statement-2?mode=html






Revenue was 17.3 percent less than in the year-earlier quarter, but it slightly more (0.9 percent) than our target.  We expected, based on the company's earlier guidance, Revenue to decline by 18 percent.  Same-store sales were down 13 percent, but (only?) by 11.5 percent if a shift in the fiscal calendar is considered.  Revenue in fiscal 2008 was 7.8 percent less than in fiscal 2007.

The Cost of Goods Sold (CGS) was 66 percent of Revenue in the quarter, which translates into a Gross Margin of 34 percent.  The quarter was, therefore, a little more profitable than expected because our Gross Margin target was 33.2 percent.  The Gross Margin was 34.3 percent in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2007.

Depreciation and Amortization expenses were 1.6 percent less than the assumed $450 million per quarter value.

Sales, General, and Administrative expenses (excluding a $387 million charge that we're handling separately) were 26.5 percent of Revenue, compared to our estimate of 25.0 percent.

We put the $387 million "business rationalization" charge,  which accounts for store closure-related asset impairments, severance pay, etc., in the Other Operating Expense category.   The value estimated previously by company management was $390 million.

The figures identified above result in Operating Income 79 percent below the amount in the year-earlier quarter.  We estimated that Operating Income would be down 72 percent.  Higher SG&A expenses was the main reason Operating Income was worse than we expected.

In the Non-Operating area, the charge to reflect the reduced value of Home Depot's investment in HD Supply matched expectations.  Net interest and other expenses was $36 million less than expected.

The costs pushed pre-tax income into negative territory.  After taking into account tax provisions and losses on discontinued operations, Net Income of  minus $54 million nearly matched our forecast of a $46 million loss.

Cash ManagementJanuary 2009
3 months prior
12 months prior
Current Ratio1.2
1.2
1.2
LTD/Equity
54.4%
56.3%64.3%
Debt/CFO
2.2 years (*)
2.1 years
2.3 years
Inventory/CGS
86.4 days
90.6 days
87.3 days
Finished Goods/Inventory
N/A
N/AN/A
Days of Sales Outstanding (DSO)5.7 days
7.6 days
10.6 days
Working Capital/Market Capitalization
4.6%
5.3%
3.0%
Cash Conversion Cycle Time (CCCT)
50.5 days
44.3 days
50.3 days
Gauge Score (0 to 25)
12
14
8
(*) Based on estimated Cash Flow from Operations in the most recent quarter.

The Cash Management metrics are surprisingly stable given the state of the economy, the weak retail sector, and the housing crisis.  Debt is decreasing slowly, but steadily, since 2007's restructuring and massive share repurchase.   The inventory reduction, compared to last year, suggests that the company is handling the sales slump as well as could be hoped.  The reduction in DSO  is a signs of improved efficiency.


GrowthJanuary 20093 months prior
12 months prior
Revenue growth-7.8%
-3.6%
-2.1%
Revenue/Assets 167%
166%
160%
CFO growth
-9.5% (*)
-19.0%
-25.2%
Net Income growth -45.1%
-31.8%
-20.1%
Gauge Score (0 to 25)1
0
0
Growth rates are trailing four quarters compared to four previous quarters.
(*) Based on estimated Cash Flow from Operations in the most recent quarter.


The contraction is Revenue worsened in the fourth quarter.  We only have actual data for Cash Flow from Operations for the first three quarters of the fiscal year.  However, the data we have suggest that the rate at which this important parameter was falling might have eased.  Net Income, of course, was negative affected by large special charges in the fourth quarter.  Until recently, we would have given the company credit for improving Revenue/Assets.  However, we no longer believe this ratio is important if Revenue is falling.


ProfitabilityJanuary 20093 months prior
12 months prior
Operating Expenses/Revenue 93.9%
92.8%90.6%
ROIC 9.8%
11.8%15.0%
FCF/Equity
18.8% (*)
16.2%10.1%
Accrual Ratio
-1.9% (*)
-0.4%-13.7%
Gauge Score (0 to 25)10
8
11
(*) Based on estimated Cash Flow from Operations in the most recent quarter.


The increase in Operating Expenses is indicative of difficult retailing environment and special charges.  We await an updated Cash Flow statement to get a better read on Profitability, but for a company in the midst of the housing slump, the ROIC and FCF figures don't look too bad.


ValueJanuary 20093 months prior
12 months prior
5-year median
P/E 16.1
13.3
11.714.3
P/E to S&P 500 average P/E 107.7%
89.2%70.1%
88.5%
Price/Revenue 0.5
0.5
0.7
1.0
Enterprise Value/Cash Flow (EV/CFO) (*)
9.1
9.411.312.0
Gauge Score (0 to 25)12
12
13
N/A
(*) Based on estimated Cash Flow from Operations in the most recent quarter.

Home Depot's stock price ended January at $21.53, which is 8.7 percent below the closing price of $23.59 on 31 October.  The shares have fallen further in February.  Per GCFR standard practice, the January closing price was used to calculate the Value gauge score.

Home Depot's valuation ratios can be compared with other companies in the Home Improvement industry.


OverallJanuary 20093 months prior
12 months prior
Gauge Score (0 to 100) 40
41
41


Home Depot's sales are off considerably, and the company has taken some painful steps to realign its cost structure to current conditions.  While the company registered a Net Loss in the very difficult fourth quarter, Home Depot would have been profitable if not for special charges involving store closures and investments.

We need to see a 10-Q with full financial statements, but we're encouraged that the drop in the Overall Gauge wasn't more severe.  Stable --  in some cases improving -- Cash Management metrics are especially welcome at this time for a firm at the intersection of two weak markets: retailing and housing.

24 February 2009

HD: Earnings Announcement 2008-4Q

The Home Depot, Inc. (NYSE: HD) has announced a small net loss, as expected, for the 13 weeks that ended on 1 February 2009.

The quarter included substantial charges to close stores, reduce personnel, and recognize the impaired value of an investment.

The full GCFR analysis of the quarter will be posted within the next few days.  The spreadsheet below, which differs in material respects from the company-used presentation, compares the latest results to the model we posted previously (and modified after the decision to close EXPO stores was announced).


http://sheet.zoho.com/public/ncarvin/hd-income-statement-2?mode=html

22 February 2009

A Second Look at Fourth Quarter Earnings

We continue to examine the results achieved by public corporations during the fourth quarter of 2008.

GCFR has already posted evaluations of the financial statements issued by:

We use the following table as a scorecard to look for trends in the unscientific sample of companies we follow.


Company
Net Income Compared to Q/E Dec 2007
Net Income Compared to GCFR Estimate
Overall Gauge Score (100 = max)
Gauge Increasing the Most
Gauge Decreasing the Most
ADP
+3.0%
+4.5%
55
None
Cash Mgt
BP
-176%
-165%
65
None Growth
Broadridge Financial
+3.5%
+9.9%
53
Value
None
Cisco Systems
-27%
-6.9%
66
Value
Profitability
ConocoPhillips
-827%
-1075%
43
Profitability Growth
Intel
-89.7%
-4.9%
47
Cash Mgt Growth
Microsoft
-11.3%
-11.7%
68
Value Growth
Nokia
-68.6%
-58.6%
38
None Value
NVIDIA
-157%
-76%
25
None
Value
PepsiCo
-43.0%
-50%
47
Value Growth
Tidewater
+30.9%
+33.9%
56
Value
None
Wal-Mart
-7.4%
-0.4%
42
Value
Growth
Watson Pharmaceuticals
+46.8%
+11.9%
56
Growth
Profitability


Companies in varied industries added big charges onto weak operating results to produce huge losses that we failed to forecast.  Tidewater has been, to date, the best surprise of the quarter.  It seems ironic, given current circumstances in its industry, that Broadridge Financial was also better than expected. 

It's an indicator of the times that none of the gauge scores increased for several companies and that the contrarian Value gauge was the one most like to move up significantly.

Similarly, it's no surprise that the Growth gauge is the one most likely to have taken a tumble.


Of the many companies that will report earnings during the week of 23 February 2009, we have posted "look-aheads" for The Home Depot, Inc. (NYSE: HD) - Look Ahead (revised after the company announced it will discontinue its EXPO Design Center business) and King Pharmaceuticals (NYSE: KG) - Look Ahead.

21 February 2009

CSCO: Financial Analysis through January 2009 (Update)

Cisco Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ: CSCO), the proud plumber of the Internet, has a commanding position in the market for enterprise networking products and services, such as routers.

We previously posted an analysis of Cisco System's press release announcing results for the three months that ended on 24 January 2009, which was the second quarter of the company's fiscal 2009.

The company has since submitted a more complete 10-Q, which we reviewed to determine if the analysis needed updating. 

Instead, we discovered that we made a data entry error when performing our initial analysis that caused us to report, on 5 February 2009, an Overall gauge score for Cisco that was four points too low.  We entered the wrong value for Cash Flow from Operations into a spreadsheet that computes the metrics that drive the gauge scores.  Correcting the mistake increased the Overall gauge score from 62 to 66 points.

We apologize for the error.

The correct set of scores is shown below:

Independent of our data entry error, the 10-Q would not have changed the gauge scores from our initial evaluation.  In addition, neither the error, nor the formal report altered our evaluation of Cisco's Income Statement.




http://sheet.zoho.com/public/ncarvin/csco-income-statement?mode=html


The following metrics were affected by our error:


Originally reported figure
Correct figure
Debt/CFO0.6 years0.5 years
CFO growth4.6%16.5%
FCF/Equity28.6% 32.2%
Accrual Ratio10.8%8.7%
Enterprise Value/Cash Flow (EV/CFO)5.85.2



We did observe a few interesting tidbits of information in the 10-Q:

1.  The allowance for doubtful receivables increased from $177 million in July 2008 to $191 million in October 2008 to $230 million in January 2009.

2.  Note 1 of the financial statements includes the following statement:  "These [cost allocation] changes also resulted in reclassifications to prior period gross margin by theater amounts."  The meaning of the phrase "theater amounts" is not known to us.  Cisco uses the term "theater" when referring to the geographic areas in which it operates.

3.  We continued to be intrigued by Cisco's purchase of Nuova Systems, Inc., which developed technologies for enterprise data centers.  Cisco first bought approximately 80 percent of Nuova in August 2006.  In 2008, Cisco exercised an option to purchase the remaining 20 or so percent.  The selling shareholders, which included several former Cisco execs, will receive up to three payments, to be made between fiscal years 2010 and 2012, with the amounts determined by an undisclosed formula.  Cisco originally indicated that the potential payout for the remaining interests in Nuova would be between $10 and $578 million.  The latest 10-Q states that Cisco has recorded total compensation charges of $317 million for these payments.  The amount can be adjusted as high as $678 million, $100 million more than the amount first cited.  Since Nuova had 76 employees in August 2006, the total charge to Cisco will be between $3.9 and $8.9 million per Nuova employee.

4.  Cisco lists short-term investments of $25.4 billion on its Balance Sheet.  Of this amount, fixed income securities comprise 97 percent, and the rest are publicly traded equity securities.  The unrealized loss on the fixed income securities is less than 1 percent, indicating the high proportion of government-backed debt and that 61 percent of these securities mature in less than one year.  The unrealized loss on equity securities is 23 percent.

5. In December 2008, Brazil asserted claims against Cisco related to alleged evasion of import taxes and other improper transactions.  Cisco denies the allegation and asserts "there is no legal basis for its alleged liability."  Cisco, for numerous reasons, indicates it is unable to estimate the range of the potential loss.  One of the reasons is "complexities and uncertainty surrounding the judicial process in Brazil."

6.  Cisco repurchased 83 million of its shares, at a cost of $1.6 billion, during the January quarter.  The average price per share was $19.48.  The current price is $15.08.

7. On 9 February 2009, Cisco made a commitment to issue $4.0 billion of senior unsecured notes.  Half of the notes will mature in 2019, and the other half will mature in 2039.  The company only needed $500 million to pay of maturing debt.  As of 24 January 2009, Cisco had long-term debt of $6.35 billion.  The increase to $10.35 billion will lift the Long-term Debt/Equity Ratio from 17.3 percent to 28.1 percent.  The decision by cash-rich Cisco to issue more debt led to speculation the company was planning for future acquisitions.